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ABSTRACT
Since Moore v. Regents of the University of California, there has been a
wide-ranging debate regarding the holding of the case and its implications for
property law. Moore stands for the notion that individuals do not have a property
interest in ordinary cells taken from their bodies during medical procedures nor
the commercial products that researchers might develop from them. At the same
time, cases such as Davis v. Davis and Hecht v. Superior Court have asserted
that individuals maintain a property interest in other types of cells—namely
embryos and gametes (eggs and sperm)—once they are removed from the body.
This, among other developments, has led to a fragmented regime in property law
pertaining to excised biological materials that turns, in large part, on the type of
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cell in question: individuals have a diminished interest in regular somatic cells
(skin, muscle, etc.) while courts have recognized that people retain a heightened
property interest in reproductive cells such as sperm, eggs, and embryos. The
articulated reason for the differential property interests in these two cell types is
that embryos and gametes have the “potential for human life” while individuals
are thought to have little use for ordinary body cells once they are excised.
This default rule has framed property law regarding excised human cells for
over two decades. It exists to balance the need for scientists to have access to
research materials with individuals’ reproductive autonomy. To the extent that
the dividing line determining the property interest in excised cells turns largely
upon their “potential for human life,” the recent development of induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) suggests that this default rule is becoming
increasingly untenable. Research has shown that iPSCs can create the ability to
genetically reprogram somatic cells into a pluripotent state that may allow them
to differentiate into other types of cells—including eggs and sperm—that can be
used to create new organisms. While these developments have not yet been fully
applied to human iPSCs, they nonetheless suggest that iPSCs may soon be able to
give ordinary somatic body cells the same potential for human life as naturally
produced embryos and gametes but without the corresponding property interest.
This Article argues that given this new technology, its relative success in
animal models, and its impending application to human cells, the current default
rules precluding individuals’ property interest in excised somatic cells needs
substantial reconsideration. We propose a three-part approach to manage the
challenges that iPSCs create for this aspect of property law. This includes (1) a
self-imposed moratorium on human applications of iPSC research that can lead
to human reproduction (2) Congressional action that vests property interests in
the donors of somatic cells once their cells have been reprogrammed to a
pluripotent state and differentiated into reproductive cells and (3) Judicial action
that distinguishes Moore and related cases by acknowledging the reversion of
property interest to donors once somatic materials are reprogrammed to a state
of pluripotency and differentiated into reproductive cells. This proposal offers the
best way to deal with the profound legal issues created by this new technology
with the least disruption to existing rules and policy preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
Like Marbury v. Madison and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California is one of a handful of cases that
virtually every first-year law student reads as part of her introduction to the
American legal system. Moore stands for what has become a proverbial default
rule in property law: individuals do not have property interests in their own
cells once they are removed from their bodies. (This default rule pertains to
cells removed from living human beings during medical procedures, not (a)
organs removed for transplant, (b) tissues subject to routine-removal statutes
such as corneas from cadavers,1 or (c) anatomical gifts. These transactions are
governed by the National Organ Transplant Act, state level implementations of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and other laws.) Thus, in Moore, researchers
at UCLA Medical Center that used John Moore’s spleen cells without his
knowledge or consent to develop a profitable cell line were not liable for
conversion2 since the Court found that Moore no longer had a property interest
in these excised cells. Yet, Moore’s holding regarding individuals’ diminished
property interests in excised cells does not apply to all human cells. There are
two exceptions: gametes (eggs and sperm) and embryos. Courts have found that
since these cells have the potential to create or become independent human
beings, individuals retain a property interest in them after being removed from
the body that does not exist for somatic cells, or the ordinary non-reproductive
cells that make up various parts of the body such as hair, skin, or Moore’s
spleen. Thus, the critical dividing line in property law with regards to
individuals’ interest in their excised cells is whether or not they have the
“potential for human life.”3
To the extent that the default rule regarding individuals’ diminished
property interest in excised human cells largely exists for policy reasons such
as promoting efficient research and respecting individuals’ reproductive
decision-making,4 this dividing line between gametes and embryos on one hand
and ordinary non-reproductive somatic cells on the other appears coherent.
Excised somatic cells that do not have any reproductive capacity are important

1. See COMMITTEE ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, ORGAN DONATION:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 206-07 (JAMES F. CHILDRESS & CATHARYN T. LIVERMAN eds.,
2006).
2. Conversion is a tort that reflects the “unauthorized and wrongful exercise of
dominion and control over another’s personal property, to the exclusion of or inconsistent
with rights of owner.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
4. Individuals’ intent and institutional informed consent play a significant role in the
disposition of these cells. See discussion in Part II.
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for scientific advancement and often have little value to most patients.
Therefore, a default rule that gives sole property interests to scientists and
research entities to the exclusion of individual patients encourages efficiency
that promotes and rewards innovation. In contrast, gametes and embryos that
have the potential to create independent human life may be extraordinarily
valuable to individuals, which law recognizes by acknowledging a continued
property interest in these types of cells once outside of the body.
However, new developments in human biotechnology are making this
dividing line increasingly untenable—to the point where current default rules
espousing individuals’ diminished property interest in somatic cells may need
substantial reconsideration. In 2007, research groups headed by Shinya
Yamanaka5 and Jamie Thompson6 demonstrated the ability to reprogram
human somatic cells into a pluripotent state. This means that regular somatic
cells like those from Moore’s spleen—the very types of cells that individuals
have a diminished property interest in once excised—can be reverted back into
a condition (pluripotency) whereby they can develop into several different
types of cells—including eggs or sperm.7 Known as induced pluripotent stem
cells (iPSCs), these cells are hailed as offering an end-run around the ethical
quagmire surrounding embryonic stem cells since they offer the promise of
regenerative medicine (where such pluripotency might allow researchers to
“grow” patient-specific cells to cure diseases) without the ethically fraught
issue of destroying embryos.
Yet at the same time that iPSC research has been heralded as resolving a
particularly thorny ethical issue, it has created a profound challenge for
property law that has gone almost wholly unnoticed. If the legal justification
for diminishing individuals’ property interests in their own somatic cells and
acknowledging scientists’ claims to own such material is that these cells do not
have the “potential for human life,” then the impending ability to reprogram
such cells into a pluripotent state where they can then differentiate into
reproductive cells with the potential to become autonomous human beings
radically upends this logic. In short, human iPSCs, if they achieve the same
potential as has already been demonstrated in animal experiments, can become
a profound game changer in that every somatic cell would have the “potential
for human life”; the proverbial spleen cells from John Moore and any other
ordinary cells removed during medical procedures would potentially be just a
few steps away from being turned into gametes that could then be used for
reproductive purposes. This suggests that this new technology might blur the
5. Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human
Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861 (2007).
6. Junying Yu et al., Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human
Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917, 1917 (2007).
7. While iPSC research with mice has shown the ability to induce somatic cells into a
pluripotent state that can then differentiate into reproductive cells, this research has not yet
been done with humans though it is considered to be feasible. See Part III.
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dividing lines and default rules in property law and that serious reconsideration
may be needed.
Despite the wide-ranging post-Moore discussion of property rights in
excised human cells, this Article is the first to identify and articulate the
profound challenges raised by iPSCs for property law. These challenges are
likely to have important implications. Given an estimated 270 million human
tissue samples held in domestic biobanks, the development of iPSCs adds a
new and qualitatively different dimension to an endearing question in property
law: who can own your body (in terms of excised cells and tissues) and under
what circumstances?
This Article proceeds in three parts to address these issues. Part I assesses
existing rules pertaining to individuals’ property interests in excised somatic
cells as well as gametes and embryos. Part I also examines key cases in the
development of this jurisprudence to identify and substantiate a basic
underlying premise in property law pertaining to excised human cells: in the
absence of a contract or preexisting agreement, default property interest in
excised human cells is given to researchers and scientists except in the case of
eggs, sperm, and embryos, whereby individuals retain a property interest since
these cells have the “potential for human life.” Thus, Part I highlights how this
potentiality is a key dividing line in establishing differential property interests
in excised human cells. Part II discusses the development of iPSCs and how
this technology might complicate the logic of this dividing line by giving
human somatic cells the potential to become life through cellular
reprogramming that reverts them to a pluripotent state where they can
differentiate into many types of cells, potentially including eggs and sperm.
Part III situates this issue in the landscape of the current scholarly debate on
property interest in human cells to highlight the transformative nature of this
technology; existing conversations have entirely missed the significance of
iPSC research for property law. We then offer a three-part proposal for how
law and science should respond to the challenges raised by iPSCs. We argue
that (1) the scientific community should engage in a self-imposed moratorium
on human applications of iPSC research that may lead to human reproduction;
(2) that Congress should enact legislation that vests property interests in
excised somatic cells in donors once these cells have been reprogrammed to a
pluripotent state and differentiated into reproductive cells; and (3) that courts
should acknowledge the heightened property interest that vests in excised
somatic cells once they are reprogrammed to a pluripotent state and
differentiated into reproductive cells. After discussing various objections some
may have with this proposal and offering rebuttals, we conclude with a brief
discussion of this Article’s significance for the future of property law.
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PROPERTY LAW REGARDING SOMATIC CELLS, GAMETES, AND EMBRYOS: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW

Since Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the law regarding
individuals’ property interests in excised cells has been fragmented and
unevenly developed. Starting with Moore, this section discusses key cases that
have laid the broad foundations for the current default rules that confer
differential property interests to human cells in a manner that depends heavily
on their potential to create or become human life. Although the case law on this
topic is scarce and dispersed, courts have consistently concluded that
individuals have little to no property interests in excised somatic cells while
also acknowledging individuals’ significant property interests in gametes and
embryos that exist outside the body. The potential to create or become full
human beings plays a large role in the court’s justification for these rules.
A. Somatic Cells
Discussions about property rights and the human body are not new.8
However, recent developments in new reproductive and genetic technologies
have given rise to novel questions about the rights individuals have in excised
tissues and cells. Moore v. Regents of the University of California represents
one of the earliest judicial considerations of this question, and its disposition
has had cascading effects on how the law understands individuals’ property
interests in their own cells once they are disconnected from their bodies.
John Moore was a patient at UCLA Medical Center in the mid 1970’s,
where he received treatment for hairy-cell leukemia. In the course of this
treatment, Dr. David Golde, Moore’s physician, took “extensive amounts of
blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances” all while knowing—

8. See generally ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997). Radhika Rao offers an
interesting discussion of an early theory of the body as property as articulated by John
Locke: “The image of the body as a form of property possessed by its ‘owner’ dates back at
least to John Locke, whose influential theory of property derived all ownership from the
property possessed by individuals in their own persons. In his treatise “Of Property,” written
around 1690, Locke asserted: “Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself.” According to Locke, individual ownership of the physical body entailed ownership
of those external things that are the product of the body’s labor. Yet Locke apparently
envisioned the body as property of a special sort, held in trust rather than as an individual
owner. As a result, he believed that a person’s rights to life and liberty were inalienable
because they were not his own, but belonged to another. These limits upon bodily property
followed from the fact that ultimate ownership rested with the deity. Thus Locke apparently
viewed individuals as stewards over their bodies, possessing themselves in trust rather than
as outright owners. Therefore, despite his reliance upon property rhetoric, his image of the
rights individuals possess in their bodies clearly does not rise to the level of complete
ownership.” Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359,
367-68 (2000).
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and without disclosing to Moore—that these biological materials “were of great
value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts,” that could provide
“competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”9 Moore also had his
spleen removed at Golde’s recommendation. While Golde received consent for
the splenectomy, he did not disclose to Moore that his spleen and other
biological materials would be used for research. Between 1976 and 1983,
Moore travelled to UCLA Medical Center from his home in Seattle to give
more samples of blood and other tissues because “he had been told that the
procedures were to be performed only there and only under Golde’s
direction.”10
Little did Moore know that Golde was working with others to develop a
cell line from T-lymphocytes derived from Moore’s tissues. Golde, Shirley
Quan, and the Regents of the University of California patented the cell line and
shared in the royalties while excluding Moore from any compensation.11
Moore brought suit, claiming a breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed
consent. Moore also brought a claim for conversion, or that the defendants
interfered with his interest in his personal property—his blood, cells, etc.—and
that he subsequently had an interest in the products derived from his bodily
materials.12 While the Court found that Dr. Golde did not fulfill his fiduciary
duty to Moore and impermissibly failed to obtain informed consent by not
disclosing his financial interests, it ruled against Moore’s conversion claims. As
a descriptive matter, the Court stated that current law simply did not support
Moore’s claim that he owned these excised biological materials, which is a
predicate to making any successful claim that they were illegally subject to
conversion.13 The Court refused to extend the principle of conversion to this
9. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
10. Id. at 482.
11. “With the Regents’ assistance, Golde negotiated agreements for commercial

development of the cell line and products to be derived from it. Under an agreement with
Genetics Institute, Golde ‘became a paid consultant’ and ‘acquired the rights to 75,000
shares of common stock.’ Genetics Institute also agreed to pay Golde and the Regents ‘at
least $ 330,000 over three years, including a pro-rata share of [Golde’s] salary and fringe
benefits, in exchange for . . . exclusive access to the materials and research performed’ on
the cell line and products derived from it. On June 4, 1982, Sandoz ‘was added to the
agreement,’ and compensation payable to Golde and the Regents was increased by $
110,000. ‘[T]hroughout this period, . . . Quan spent as much as 70 [percent] of her time
working for [the] Regents on research’ related to the cell line.” Id. at 482.
12. “Moore also attempts to characterize the invasion of his rights as a conversion – a
tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal
property. He theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal from his
body, at least for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to their use
in potentially lucrative medical research. Thus, to complete Moore’s argument, defendants’
unauthorized use of his cells constitutes a conversion. As a result of the alleged conversion,
Moore claims a proprietary interest in each of the products that any of the defendants might
ever create from his cells or the patented cell line.” Id. at 487.
13. Quoting Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co, the Moore Court noted
that “to establish a conversion, plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his
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novel area of excised cells for three reasons. First, the Court noted that this
analogy—treating excised biological materials like personal property—had not
been supported by any other court, suggesting a general consensus that
individuals did not retain an ownership interest in cells akin to personal
property once removed from the body. Second, state statutes limited what
individuals could do with excised biological materials, which suggested that
any ownership interest in them has been significantly curtailed.14 Lastly, with
regard to Moore’s claim that he had a property interest in the cell line derived
from him, the Court reasoned that “[it] cannot be Moore’s property . . . .
because the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the
cells taken from Moore’s body.”15
But the Court also made a series of normative claims regarding whether a
property interest in excised cells ought to be recognized to support Moore’s
conversion claims, which allowed the Court to discuss various policy issues
implicated by this situation in a manner that has substantially affected this area
of law. The Court cited three policy reasons to explain why the use of excised
cells in medical research did not constitute conversion. First, the Court
explained that these issues are better handled by legislatures. Second, the Court
acknowledged that a tort of conversion is not necessary to affirm or protect the
rights of patients. But the Court seemed most disturbed by the third reason: that
potentially adverse impacts might follow from extending the tort of conversion
into the area of biomedical specimens. The Court noted:
Research on human cells plays a critical role in medical research. This is so
because researchers are increasingly able to isolate naturally occurring,
medically useful biological substances and to produce useful quantities of
such substances through genetic engineering. These efforts are beginning to
bear fruit. Products developed through biotechnology that have already been
approved for marketing in this country include treatments and tests for
leukemia, cancer, diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant rejection,
emphysema, osteoporosis, ulcers, anemia, infertility, and gynecological
ownership or right of possession . . . Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged
to have been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for
conversion.” Id. at 488.
14. “Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 7054.4, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains,
or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment,
incineration, or any other method determined by the state department [of health services] to
protect the public health and safety.’ Clearly the Legislature did not specifically intend this
statute to resolve the question of whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the
nonconsensual use of excised cells. A primary object of the statute is to ensure the safe
handling of potentially hazardous biological waste materials. Yet one cannot escape the
conclusion that the statute’s practical effect is to limit, drastically, a patient’s control over
excised cells. By restricting how excised cells may be used and requiring their eventual
destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that
one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to “property” or “ownership” for
purposes of conversion law.” Id. at 491-92.
15. Id. at 492.
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tumors, to name but a few . . . . [T]he extension of conversion law into this
area will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw
materials. . . . [The] exchange of scientific materials, which still is relatively
free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the
potential subject matter of a lawsuit.16

Thus, the burden that might befall the scientific community drives much of the
Court’s concern. For the Moore court, the legislature should lead such farreaching changes rather than the judiciary since they involve policy issues far
beyond individual property rights. The end result is that after Moore,
individuals are thought to have radically diminished property interests in their
excised somatic cells, although physicians and researchers still have a duty to
inform patients that their biological materials may be used in research and for
commercial purposes.
Subsequent cases have further discussed and reaffirmed the Moore court’s
conclusion that individuals do not have a property interest in excised cells.
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, a 2003 decision by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, involved
the disposition of human tissues given to researchers for the purpose of
identifying the genes responsible for Canavan diseases and developing carrier
tests that would permit prenatal screening. This collaboration, where affected
patients gave tissues and other biological materials to researchers, led to a
breakthrough that identified the Canavan-associated gene. While the plaintiffs
expected that any developments stemming from research using their blood and
tissues would be offered in an affordable and accessible manner that stayed in
the public domain, the researchers patented the gene. This gave the researchers
and the hospital “the ability to restrict any activity related to the Canavan
disease gene, including without limitation: carrier and prenatal testing, gene
therapy, and other treatments . . . .”17 Soon after, the hospital allegedly
threatened other hospitals that infringed their patent through unauthorized
testing and began negotiating licenses and royalty fees that restricted the tests’
availability. The tissue donors sued, saying that they were not aware of the
researchers’ intent to patent the research or commercialize it.
The plaintiffs made several claims in their suit, including lack of informed
consent, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent concealment. The plaintiffs’
conversion allegation claimed a property interest in research stemming from
their donated tissues and blood. This was based on an underlying claim that
they continued to possess a property interest in these biological materials once
excised from their bodies. The court declined to extend conversion theory to
excised tissues, stating that the tissues were “donations to research without any
contemporaneous expectations of return of the body tissue and genetic

16. Id. at 494-99.
17. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067

(S.D. Fla. 2003).
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samples . . . .”18 Citing Moore, the court noted “[t]he California Supreme
Court . . . held that the use of the results of medical research inconsistent with
the wishes of the donor was not conversion, because the donor had no property
interest at stake after the donation was made . . . . Similarly [in Greenberg], the
property right in blood and tissue samples also evaporates once the sample is
voluntarily given to a third party.”19 It is also important to note that the
Greenberg court adopted the same consequentialist reasoning articulated in
Moore for denying the plaintiffs’ conversion claim. The Court plainly stated,
“if adopted, the expansive theory championed by plaintiffs would cripple
medical research as it would bestow a continuing right for donors to possess the
results of any research conducted by the hospital.”20
Washington University v. Catalona presented a similar issue before the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007. Dr. William Catalona was a urologist
at Washington University where his primary research area was prostate cancer.
During his nearly three-decade tenure at Washington University, he amassed a
large biorepository of blood and tissue for prostate cancer research—both from
his patients and through larger scale recruiting.21 Catalona accepted a new
position at Northwestern in 2003 and sent letters to the research participants
asking that they sign a form allowing their samples to be transferred from
Washington University to his new employer. Washington University filed a
declaratory action in 2003 that sought to establish their ownership of the
repository amassed by Catalona and all of the biological samples that it
contained.
The court held in favor of Washington University, finding that the patients’
stored samples were inter vivos gifts donated to the university and remained its
property whereby the individual donors could not re-assign the gifts to
Catalona. This rationale is similar to that used by the Greenberg court; by
framing the research participants as “donors” who made a “gift,” the court
18. Id. at 1074.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1076.The Greenberg court uses a similar argument in rejecting the plaintiff’s

claim that the researchers failure to disclose their economic interests amounted to a lack of
informed consent: “[D]isclosing economic interests has no support in established law, and
more ominously, this requirement would have pernicious effects over medical research, as it
would give each donor complete control over how medical research is used and who benefits
from that research.” Id. at 1070.
21. “At the time of the district court’s permanent injunction hearing in this case, more
than 30,000 [research participants] were enrolled in WU prostate cancer research studies.
About 2,500 to 3,000 [research participants] had been patients of Dr. Catalona. The
Biorepository contains: (1) approximately 3,500 prostate tissue samples taken from patients
of Dr. Catalona and other WU physicians within the Division; (2) about 100,000 blood or
serum samples donated by over 28,000 men, 75% of whom were not patients of any WU
physician, but rather were volunteers recruited through the media; and (3) DNA samples
provided by approximately 4,400 men, which included patients of different WU physicians
and relatives of those patients.” Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir.
2007).
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implicitly acknowledged that any residual property interest that the individuals
might have in their excised tissue was relinquished by agreeing to participate in
medical research.22 This leads to what has now become a jurisprudentially
familiar result: individuals have diminished property interests in excised
somatic cells and tissues used for research purposes. Taken together, these
three cases indicate the parameters of a general default rule that excised human
cells and tissues used in medical research are the property of the researcher
and/or research institution rather than the individual donor.
B. Embryos and Gametes
Courts have taken a different approach to understanding individuals’
property interests in other forms of human cells, namely embryos and gametes.
This section briefly describes two influential cases that highlight the way courts
approach individuals’ property interests in this area.
Davis v. Davis, a 1992 opinion from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, was
one of the earliest judicial opinions to consider the proper disposition of frozen
embryos held in a fertility clinic where there was not any preexisting agreement
or contract to determine how unused embryos should be handled. The genetic
parents, Mary Sue and Junior Davis, divorced; Mary Sue initially wanted to
gestate the embryos and then wanted to donate them to an infertile couple while
Junior wanted the embryos discarded. Not only did the couple not stipulate
what should happen to any unused embryos prior to their divorce, but there was
also no relevant state statute to determine the embryos’ fate. Thus, the court
examined a number of scientific, ethical, and legal perspectives to determine
how to proceed. Davis remains a leading case regarding the disposition of
gametes and embryos because it provides a broad framework for courts to use
when assessing this issue:
Disputes involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced by in vitro
fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the
progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then
their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior
agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using
the pre-embryos must be weighed.23

But what is particularly important for this Article is the court’s reasoning
on whether embryos are “persons” or “property” in determining progenitors’
rights with regards to their disposition in the absence of any contract or other
agreement. The court concluded that embryos:
[A]re not, strictly speaking, either “persons” or “property,” but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential

22. The court referenced the consent form and brochure distributed to research
participants in coming to this decision. See id. at 674-75.
23. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
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for human life . . . . [The Davis’ interest] is not a true property interest.
However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent
that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos.24

Thus, the Davis court distinguished the property interest that individuals
might have in embryos from other types of excised somatic cells and tissues,
largely based upon their “potential for human life” or the capacity to develop
into an autonomous human being. This potential is not enough to give
individuals a standard property interest over embryos. But, it is enough,
according to the court, to give the genetic parents authority to determine how
the embryos will ultimately be used—which is the precise property interest that
was sought by and denied to the cell and tissue progenitors in Moore,
Greenberg, and Catalona.
Decided four years after Davis, Hecht v. Superior Court is significant in
that it applied the same “potential for human life” rationale for giving
individuals a heightened property interest in gametes and not only embryos.
Hecht concerned the disposition of fifteen sperm vials left to Deborah Hecht by
her partner, William Kane, after his death. Hecht intended to use Kane’s sperm
to attempt to conceive and give birth to a child. Kane’s two adult children
objected, leading to the suit. Central to this case is whether or not Kane
“owned” the sperm vials in a manner that allowed him to give this type of
property to Hecht. Relying on Moore, Kane’s children argued that Kane could
not have a property interest in his sperm or control its disposition once outside
of his body much like the California Supreme Court held that Moore did not
have a property interest in his excised cells. The California Court of Appeals
rejected this application of Moore to gametes in the first of three Hecht
decisions, noting that the “decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership,
to the extent that he had decision making authority [ ] to the sperm. . . . [that]
falls within the broad definition of property.”25 Even though Kane was dead at
the time of this dispute, the court’s inquiry focused largely on what type of
interest Kane had in his sperm while alive and whether that allowed him to give
it to Hecht.26 The court used Davis to distinguish Hecht from Moore to find a
residual property interest in gametes that is akin to that found in embryos
because of their shared potential to create life. The Hecht court wrote that
sperm “is unlike other human tissue because it is ‘gametic material’ that can be
used for reproduction . . . . [T]he value of sperm [as in embryos] lies in its
potential to create a child . . . . [Therefore] decedent had an interest, in the
nature of ownership . . . . [that] is sufficient to constitute ‘property.’”27 As in
the embryo cases, donors’ intent remains primary in determining the
24. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
25. Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 (1993).
26. Kane’s will also stated that his sperm should be given to Hecht after his death. See

Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1292 (1996).
27. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850 (emphasis added).
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disposition of gametes and frames the nature of the property interest involved.
For example, in Estate of Kievernagel v. Kievernagel, the court cited Hecht in
acknowledging that “gametic material, with its potential to produce life, is a
unique type of property and thus not governed by the general laws relating to
gifts or personal property or transfer of personal property upon death”28 so as
to deny a widow’s claim to her late husband’s sperm precisely because he
wanted the sperm destroyed when he died. To be sure, most cases regarding the
disposition of excised embryos and gametes focus on ascertaining and giving
effect (where discernable) to the intent of the parties as articulated in informed
consent forms or other written agreements at the time of the procedure.29
However, for the purposes of this Article, Davis and Hecht are important in that
they exist outside of the realm of contractual or statutory interpretation to
understand the residual property interests that parties retain in excised gametes
and embryos as distinct from ordinary somatic cells because of their potential
to become human life.
C. Distinctions Between Cases Involving Somatic Cells and
Gametes/Embryos
There are at least two distinctions between these two sets of cases that are
worth noting. First, the cases pertaining to somatic cells and tissues (Moore,
Greenberg, Catalona) deal with disputes between patients/research participants
and biomedical research entities while the embryo and gamete cases (Davis,
Hecht) deal with disputes between individual litigants outside of the context of
medical research. Thus, the courts’ discussion of property rights occurs in two
different contexts where there are different sets of competing interests. For
example, the cases dealing with somatic cells and tissues each stress the
adverse impact that might occur to scientific research if patients and research
participants retained a controlling property interest in their excised materials
and how this may work against the public interest. This broader notion of
efficient use of cells and tissues to yield a wider social benefit is absent from
disputes concerning gametes and embryos. Instead, the litigants are dealing
with issues pertaining to reproduction that have a different set of social and
legal concerns such as the appropriate dispensation of property in probate
matters, privacy, the right to procreate, and the right to not be a parent. This,
however, may be a distinction without much of a difference. What is of interest

28. In re Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1030 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998), citing Davis in stating that “the

relevant inquiry thus becomes who has dispositional authority over [the embryos]. Because
that question is answered in this case by the parties’ agreement . . . we have no cause to
decide whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to ‘special respect.’” Id. at 564-65; Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002), noting that the court “based[d] [its] decision . . . solely
upon the contractual rights of the parties under the pre-embryo cryopreservation contract
with the Loma Linda Center for Fertility and In Vitro Fertilization.” Id. at 271.
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to the many scholarly and judicial disquisitions on Moore and its progeny is the
specific question of what property interests individuals have in excised cells
and tissue, regardless of whether the person exerting a competing claim is a
scientist or an ex-spouse. The differential contexts that underlie the
juxtaposition of property interests in somatic cells and tissues versus those in
gametes and embryos should not disqualify such analyses as an apples and
oranges comparison; indeed, it is not uncommon for courts to look across
contexts to clarify the precise property interest involved.30 Rather, these cases
should be looked at broadly and comparatively to draw greater scrutiny to
default rules conferring differential property interests in somatic cells and
gametes/embryos.
Second, the cases pertaining to gametes and embryos place a higher
premium on fulfilling the progenitors’ intent at the time of removal. For
example, the Hecht court found that Kane had sufficient interest in his sperm
for it to constitute property in terms of conferring jurisdiction of the dispute to
the Probate Court.31 But much of this finding is driven by the court’s
acknowledgement that gametes are a special type of property that should be
disposed of according to the donor’s intent. In rejecting the trial court’s order to
destroy the sperm, the appellate court noted that Kane’s “will evidences the
decedent’s intent that Hecht, should she so desire, is to receive his sperm stored
in the sperm bank to bear his child posthumously.”32 The Hecht court relied
heavily upon the test set forth by Davis to determine the dispensation of
gametes when there is a dispute, where primacy is given to the “preferences of
the progenitors.”33 Given the clarity of Kane’s intent as expressed in his will,
the Hecht court simply applied Kane’s intent as articulated.34
30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 970-71 (Conn. 1999).
Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850.
Id. at 850-51.
The full test elaborated by the Davis court states: “[W]e hold that disputes
involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be
resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be
ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should
be carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using
or not using the pre-embryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid
procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of
achieving parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question. If no other
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the pre-embryos to achieve
pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the pre-embryos
intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the
greater interest and should prevail.” Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
34. “Given the procedural posture of this case, and the fact that, for purposes of
addressing real parties’ arguments, we are assuming that decedent intended to allow Hecht to
use his sperm for posthumous artificial insemination, it is premature for us to apply the
Davis test. At this point, the only issue which we address is whether artificial insemination
with the sperm of a decedent violates public policy. There is nothing in Davis which
indicates that such artificial insemination violates public policy.” Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at
859.
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Intent arguably cuts the other way in cases dealing with somatic cells and
tissues. In each of these cases, litigation arose out of plaintiffs’ contention that
their cells or tissues were being used in a manner inconsistent with their intent
or expectations at the time they donated the biological materials. Yet, courts
have consistently disregarded these claims in favor of conferring a controlling
property interest to researchers once the cells or tissues have been excised—
even when, as in Moore, the court simultaneously finds that the researcher
breached his disclosure obligations in a manner that may very well have altered
the patient’s medical decision-making.35 The Moore court specifically denied
the conversion claim because they concluded that Moore “clearly did not
expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal”36 and that it
would be inappropriate to acknowledge any lingering property interest that
legitimizes the conversion claim since such recognition had not been granted
by previous courts. Such a ruling would be contrary to California statutes that
restrict patient interest in excised cells. Moreover, the Court also found that the
patented cell line was sufficiently different to preclude Moore’s claim to
ownership. Thus, the Court disregarded Moore’s intent and expectations as
expressed in the suit. Viewed another way, they only looked at what his
intent/expectations could legally be at the time the cells were excised rather
than taking seriously his actual intent/expectations as expressed during the
litigation. The Greenberg court also articulated this comparatively thin
understanding of intent in the context of somatic cells and tissues, saying that
the tissues in question were donated37 and that, following Moore, researchers’
use of the materials in a manner inconsistent with the donors’ intent or
expectations was irrelevant since they no longer had a legal interest in them.38
Where Greenberg used the language of “donation” to characterize the transfer
of property interest in somatic tissues and to curtail any serious consideration of
the plaintiff’s intent, Catalona embraced the language of “gift” to achieve
similar ends:
Our conclusion that the [research participants] intended to make gifts of their
biological samples at the time of their donation is bolstered further by the
language of the brochure, which characterized the [research participants’]
donations as “a free and generous gift of [biological materials] to research that
may benefit society.” The brochure’s acknowledgment that donated materials
may be shared with non-WU researchers, without any further authorization

35. Though the Moore court did not allow Moore’s conversion claim, they nonetheless
held that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may
affect his medical judgment.” Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal.
1990).
36. Id. at 488-89.
37. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
38. Id. at 1074 (citing Moore, 51 Cal.3d 120).
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needed from the [research participants], informed the [research participants]
they would relinquish or abandon the right to designate the particular
destination of their biological materials upon agreeing to participate in a
medical research study. Such language, considered together with the consent
form, cannot reasonably be characterized as reflecting the [research
participants’] intention either to entrust their samples solely to Dr. Catalona or
to transfer the samples in some legal form other than a gift.39

Thus, the potential for gametes and embryos to develop into autonomous
human beings constitutes a legally significant default rule that amplifies
donors’ intent so as to acknowledge a property interest that exists after
removal. The inability of somatic cells and tissues to generate human beings
diminishes the seriousness in which courts consider donors’ intent—even when
the use of these materials is so egregiously inconsistent with their desires that it
generates litigation—leading courts to effectively decline any property interests
that individuals have to them or any derivative product. Therefore, the type of
cell or tissue in question, in terms of its ability to create or become a human
being, appears to be the most legally significant variable in how the court
determines whether individuals maintain a residual property interest in
extracorporeal materials. Individuals’ diminished property interest in somatic
cells and tissues and heightened property interest in gametes and embryos are
justified by what is perceived to be a clear dividing line: the potential to
become human life. In the next section, we discuss how the development of
iPSCs poses serious challenges to this default rule.
II.

INDUCED PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK,
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY LAW
A. A Brief Description of the Technology

The biomedical promise and excitement surrounding stem cells lies in their
ability to differentiate into different types of cells. Stem cells are unlike other
cells in three regards:40 (1) they are unspecialized (i.e. they do not have tissuespecific structures that limit them to only performing particular functions41);

39. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674-75 (8th Cir. 2007). The court noted
that the research participants’ (RP’s) options with regards to directing the use of their tissues
were quite limited: “The RPs’ subsequent rights to their biological materials were expressly
limited to the option to discontinue participation in the study to avoid answering additional
questions, donating more biological materials, or allowing their biological materials to be
used for further research. Beyond these particular and limited rights, the RPs retained no
greater interest with regard to their biological materials. Such rights cannot be equated with
or interpreted to include the broad privileges or proprietary interests advocated by the
defendants.” Id. at 675.
40. See generally NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, STEM CELL BASICS (2009), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics2.asp.
41. Id.
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(2) they can divide and replicate for a long time; and (3) they can differentiate
into specialized cells. Typically, stem cells come in two types: adult and
embryonic. Adult stem cells are mature stem cells found in particular tissues
(bone marrow, heart, etc.) of mature organisms and “are responsible for
renewing and repairing the body’s specialized cells.”42 Adult stem cells are
multipotent, meaning that they ordinarily can only differentiate (become more
specialized) into a limited number of cell types. Embryonic stem cells, which
are coaxed from early stage human embryos, are unique in that they are
pluripotent, meaning that they can differentiate into derivatives of any of the
three main categories of human tissues—“ectoderm (skin, nerves, brain),
mesoderm (bone, muscle), and endoderm (lungs, digestive system)”43—as well
as germ cells that are the precursors for gametes.
Pluripotency is a key trait; it lays the foundation for the promise of
regenerative medicine where patient-specific tissues can be developed to treat
many illnesses. For example, one approach might involve treating heart disease
by employing embryonic stem cells to develop patient-specific replacement
cells that might be able to repair damaged heart tissue.44 Similarly, embryonic
stem cells might be used to develop patient-specific nerve tissue that might
regenerate spinal cord tissues to help give movement back to paralyzed
individuals.45 Thus, many researchers believe that embryonic stem cells’
pluripotency creates an avenue of research that is more promising than the
limitations associated with adult stem cells, which do not exhibit this trait.
However, the promise behind embryonic stem cells is not without ethical
controversy. Obtaining access to these pluripotent stem cells requires
destroying embryos. Many people consider embryos to be no less a form of
human life than an actual human being, making it ethically problematic to
destroy one form of life to save or heal another. This has led to a form of stem
cell politics that mirrors abortion politics, where competing definitions of when
life begins often determines how individuals understand the legitimacy of this
medical technique.
It is in this context that the 2007 discovery of iPSCs was heralded as a new
technology that might resolve this ethical and political problem. By adding a
handful of genes to somatic cells and providing the right laboratory
environment, these cells can be “induced” or “reprogrammed” to revert back to
a pluripotent state that exhibits the same characteristics as embryonic stem

42. Insoo Hyun, Stem Cells, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE
HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND
CAMPAIGNS, 159, 159 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).
43. Id.
44. See generally Siamak Davani et al., Can Stem Cells Mend a Broken Heart, 65
CARDIOVASCULAR RESEARCH 305, 310 (2005).
45. See generally M.A. Woodbury, Hans Keirstead Can Make Mice Walk Again (and
Humans Too?), ESQUIRE MAGAZINE, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.esquire.com/
features/best-and-brightest-2009/human-embryonic-stem-cell-research-1209.
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cells—all without having to destroy an embryo.46 These reprogrammed cells
can, in effect, give rise to an entirely new organism from somatic cells—which
has not yet been done with humans but was demonstrated by two separate
teams in 2009 with mice.47 Using somatic cells taken from the skin of adult
mice, these researchers used a virus to inject four genes into mice cells, which
reprogrammed the cells to a state of pluripotency, causing them to exhibit the
same plasticity as embryonic stem cells. They were then implanted in the
acellular surrounding material of a nonviable “tetraploid” embryo that had its
own cells modified; the new embryo with the reprogrammed somatic cells then
developed into new baby mice. iPSCs have also been used to reprogram mouse
somatic cells into pluripotent cells that were then differentiated into precursor
germ cells that were used in fertilization.48 While these mouse experiments
pertaining to reproduction via iPSCs have not yet been demonstrated with
human somatic cells, there is growing evidence that human applications are
feasible and a logical extension of these animal experiments.49
B. Potential Applications of iPSC Research With Human Cells
There are several potential applications of iPSC research with human cells
that might directly implicate the property interests of individual cell and tissue
donors. It has been estimated that there are over 270 million tissue samples
stored in U.S. biobanks alone, with an additional 20 million samples being
added every year.50 While some of these biobanks contain eggs, sperm, and
embryos, millions of these samples are ordinary somatic cells and tissues used
by scientists to conduct research that may lead to new therapies and treatments.
While there is a robust debate regarding biobank governance to manage their
disposition and to protect patients from privacy intrusions or from other harms

46. See generally Takahashi et al., supra note 5; Yu et al., supra note 6.
47. See generally Lan Kang et al., iPS Cells Can Support Full-Term Development of

Tetraploid Blastocyst-Complemented Embryos, 5 CELL STEM CELL 1, 1-4 (2009); Xiao-yang
Zhao et al., iPS Cells Produce Viable Mice Through Tetraploid Complementation, 461
NATURE 86, 86-89 (2009).
48. Masanori Imamura et al., Induction of Primordial Germ Cells From Mouse
Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Derived from Adult Hepatocytes, 77 MOLECULAR REPROD. &
DEV. 802, 808 (2010); Natalie de Souza, Gametes from Stem Cells, 8 NATURE METHODS 789,
789 (2011).
49. See Charles A. Easley IV et. al., Direct Differentiation of Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells into Haploid Spermatogenic Cells, 2 CELL REPORTS 440, 443-44 (2012) (evidencing
advances in using iPSC technology to turn human somatic cells into gametes); Rosa
Silverman, Scientists Create Sperm from Skin Sample, UK TELEGRAPH, Aug. 29, 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9505267/Scientists-create-sperm-fromskin-sample.html. The study’s lead author told the UK Telegraph “[n]o one has been able to
make human sperm from pluripotent stem cells . . . in the lab, but this research indicates it
might be possible.”
50. Susanne B. Haga & Laura M. Beskow, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of
Biobanks for Genetics Research, 60 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 505, 506 (2008).
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that may lead to having their tissues identified,51 the possibility that somatic
cells in biobanks might be used for iPSC research raises important questions for
property law that have not even been articulated yet alone addressed.
Although iPSC research has been touted as resolving debates regarding the
ethics of destroying embryos to harvest pluripotent stem cells, some
commentators have pointed to new ethical problems created by this emerging
technology. One looming ethical issue is the notion of consent. It is common
practice that individuals provide written consent to physicians and researchers
to use their excised cell and tissue samples for research. However, patients and
research participants often do this with an implicit understanding that there are
certain biological limitations regarding what can be done with their somatic
cells and tissues. The advent of iPSCs, however, suggests radically different
possibilities—including the reprogramming of somatic cells into precursor
germ cells that can mature into gametes that can be fertilized and grow into a
living person.
Standard informed consent forms typically do not contemplate this
possibility. To use somatic cells obtained under existing informed consent
processes for iPSC research without raising the new possibilities to patients and
research participants is ethically problematic for the obvious reasons that many
people would object to their cells being used in a manner that may
indiscriminately create new life that would be genetically related to them.52
Another concern is privacy. iPSC lines derived from a living individual
contains genetic information about the donor and his/her relatives that may be
sensitive. De-identification may not always be desirable in the context of iPSC
research for both clinical and technical reasons.53
The third major ethical issue with iPSC research is that it is a relatively
straightforward process that is not difficult to replicate.54 In short,

51. See generally David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust
as a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1182-83 (2003).
52. See generally Katriina Aalto-Setälä et al., Obtaining Consent for Future Research
with Induced Pluripotent Cells: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 PLOS BIOLOGY 204, 207
(2009).
53. Amy Zarzeczny et al., iPS Cells: Mapping the Policy Issues, 139 CELL 1032, 1033
(2009). “One way for researchers to address these [privacy] concerns is to de-identify or
anonymize the data at the time of donation. However, there are various problems with this
approach. First, there are clinical, research, and policy reasons why anonymization (that is,
de-linkage from identifiable information) may not be an ideal approach. For instance, future
clinical applications (e.g. transplantation) may necessitate obtaining follow up information
about the donor’s health status. Second, with the advent of large-scale genome-wide
association studies, technology now exists to detect a specific individual’s single nucleotide
polymorphism, even when de-identified and in a pooled data set.”
54. David Cyranoski, 5 Things to Know Before Jumping on the iPS Bandwagon, 452
NATURE 406, 406 (2008). Although the process is rather straightforward, iPS cells can be
rather difficult to develop. Nature’s David Cyranoski reports that “as simple as this
procedure might seem, iPS cells are not easy to make. Kathrin Plath at the University of
California, Los Angeles estimates that each of the reprogramming genes (she used six) has
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reprogramming somatic body cells into a pluripotent state only requires
inserting four genes in culture to trigger the process of de-differentiation that
turns a regular somatic cell (e.g. skin) into a pluripotent state55 that can
differentiate into reproductive cells. Shinya Yamanaka, who led one of the first
teams to discover iPS cells stated “we are presenting new ethical issues, maybe
worse ones, because many people can do this—and without telling anybody.”56
As an editorial from Nature noted, “the facility with which iPS cells can be
derived could make it easier to derive gametes from any person, living or
dead.”57 This combination of (a) a transformative technology that is (b)
straightforward to conduct with (c) widely accessible raw materials (somatic
cells and tissues) stored by the millions in biobanks and (d) a legal regime
whereby the progenitors of these raw materials have no legal interest in their
own cells and tissues (while also remaining vulnerable to third party usage that
could be quite damaging) might produce disputes and unwanted outcomes of an
order of magnitude that was previously unimaginable. Put bluntly, any person
who has had a tissue biopsy stored in a biobank may now, at least theoretically,
become a genetic parent without their consent.
One particularly sensitive area of research is the use of iPSCs for
reproductive medicine. The specter of this type of research draws attention not
only to the fraught nature of iPSC research in the current bioethical and
biomedical environments but also to its legally problematic dynamics. The
advent of iPSCs implicate property interests in ways that obliterate the rationale
for the existing default rules that apportion differential property interests
according to cells’ potential to create new human beings. For example, to the
extent that iPSC research might be able to reprogram and differentiate somatic
cells into reproductive cells that can become mature gametes, researchers may
find iPSC-derived gametes “useful both for understanding gametogenesis and
as a potential infertility treatment [whereby] gametes derived from iPS cells
would have virtually the same DNA as the somatic cell donor.”58 A less
scrupulous researcher could use iPSC methods and readily available somatic
cells and tissues to pursue human cloning—even in jurisdictions that ban
reproductive cloning by other means.59 Beyond notions of privacy and consent,
only a 15% chance of making it into a given cell. Even if they all make it, the cell has only a
5% chance of being fully reprogrammed. The low efficiency presents a riddle for scientists,
but with millions of cells available in a biopsy sample, it is not a roadblock.”
55. Justin Lowenthal et al., Specimen Collection for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell
Research: Harmonizing the Approach to Informed Consent, 1 STEM CELLS TRANSLATIONAL
MED. 409, 409 (2012). “Although recent evidence has tempered the hope that translating
these technologies toward new therapies will be easy, there is great interest in using iPSC
lines to advance translational goals. A broad range of human tissue types are currently being
procured to facilitate the generation of iPSC lines.”
56. Cyranoski, supra note 54, at 408.
57. New Sources of Sex Cells, 452 NATURE 913, 913 (2008)
58. Aalto-Setälä et al., supra note 52, at 206.
59. “In theory, injecting human iPSCs into a human tetraploid blastocyst could create
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it is likely that scenarios such as these would be quite troubling to the somatic
cell donor if they came to pass for the precise reasons that law has recognized a
residual property interest in gametes and embryos: the potential to create new
individuals intuitively gives donors a heightened interest in how their cells are
used, lest a genetically related version of themselves be created without their
knowledge or against their wishes. Yet, in the existing legal regime, donors of
somatic cells and tissues would have no recourse to even prevent a scientist
from pursuing the most questionable types of research with their biological
materials.
III.

NORMATIVE PROPOSALS

iPSCs pose a dramatic challenge to this default rule in property law, which
recognizes an individual’s property interests in excised gametes and embryos
based on their “potential for human life” while refusing any corollary property
interest in excised somatic cells. While research with iPSCs in humans is in its
early stages, the developments with mice cells suggest that it may soon be
possible for excised human somatic cells to be reprogrammed and
differentiated into reproductive cells, which would have the very potential for
life that courts have identified as a prerequisite for having a residual property
interest in excised cells. Therefore, iPSCs can make it technically feasible for
any regular somatic cell—from an individual’s hair, skin, or Moore’s storied
spleen—to be reprogrammed in a manner that can create life. Somatic cells
now arguably have the same potential to become new human beings that
embryos and gametes do, but without a corresponding property interest to
prevent misuse or to respect individuals’ wishes concerning the disposition of
such cells. While the development of iPSCs have led to important
reconsiderations regarding informed consent60 and intellectual property,61

a child who is a clone of the somatic cell donor and whose placenta comes from the donor(s)
of the blastomeres. . . . [M]any current policies ban only human reproductive cloning by
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).” Bernard Lo et al., Cloning Mice and Men:
Prohibiting the Use of iPS Cells for Human Reproductive Cloning, 6 CELL STEM CELL 16, 16
(2010).
60. See Lowenthal et al., supra note 55. The development of iPSCs creates important
questions regarding informed consent, i.e. how can a patient consent to donating tissues that
may be subject to iPSC research when it is not yet entirely clear what that research might
entail. It is interesting to note that while they do not speak to the exact issues discussed in
this Article, existing regulations for human embryonic stem cells do not give donors
downstream control over their usage. For example, the NIH Guidelines on Human Stem Cell
Research only states that donors “should have been informed that they retained the right to
withdraw consent for the donation of the embryo” and that they should also be informed that
“the results of research using [human embryonic stem cells] may have commercial potential,
and that the donor(s) would not receive financial or any other benefits from any such
commercial development.” NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM
CELL RESEARCH, II(A)(3)(d)(iii), II(A)(3)(e)(vi) (2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2009guidelines.htm. Guidelines from the California Institute
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scholars have not identified nor discussed the tensions created for property law.
This section fills this void by first discussing the existing relevant literature.
We then offer a three-part proposal that addresses the challenges posed by
iPSCs for property law and then discuss concerns that may be raised by our
recommendations.
A. Existing Literature
Legal scholars have not discussed the transformative challenges that iPSCs
pose for property law. The scholarly literature regarding property interest in
human cells and tissues has largely focused on exploring different theoretical or
doctrinal bases to rethink the default rules established by Moore—i.e., that
individuals do not have a property interest in their excised somatic cells.
Scholars have been largely critical of Moore’s holding and have offered
alternative paradigms as solutions. For example, Robin Feldman has recently
argued that “[i]t defies common sense to say that an individual lab can hold
property rights in the tangible cells removed from a person’s body while the
person whose body supplied the cells cannot.”62 This intuitive understanding
that Moore was incorrectly decided leads Feldman to urge courts to revisit the
issue in light of the knowledge gleaned through decades of experience since the
initial decision.63 Pilar Ossorio shares a similar normative sensibility64 in
arguing that a formal transfer (gift, sale, etc.) should be needed before a
researcher can use someone else’s tissues for their own purposes.65 Radhika

of Regenerative Medicine (CIRM)—the largest state level program for stem cell funding –
note that “donor[s] will have no legal or financial interest in any commercial development
resulting from the research” and that “a donor must be given the opportunity to impose
restrictions on future uses of donated materials [but that] researchers may choose to use
materials only from donors who agree to all future uses without restriction.” CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 17, § 100100(b)(1)(I), § 100100(b)(2)(2012).
61. See Robin Feldman & Deborah Furth, The Intellectual Property Landscape for iPS
Cells, 3 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 16 (2010).
62. Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects
of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2011).
63. “Our enthusiasm and appreciation for the miraculous advances of science should
not blind us to the necessity of thinking through the interests of the people whose cells
provide the raw materials, nor should it obviate the necessity of ensuring that those raw
materials are properly obtained. Perhaps courts in the appropriate jurisdictions will feel
moved to revisit these issues, now that we have decades of experience with this type of
scientific research.” Id. at 1385.
64. “If one accepts the proposition ‘my body belongs to me,’ then I think there is a
strong argument that extracorporeal bodily materials should be considered, initially, the
property of the person from whom it was derived. . . . Does changing the location of bodily
material from within my body to outside my body change my property rights in that
material? I do not think so.” Pilar N. Ossorio, Property Rights and Human Bodies, in WHO
OWNS LIFE?, 223, 234-35 (David Magnus, Arthur Caplan, & Glenn McGee eds., 2002).
65. Ossorio states that “the individual from whom bodily materials are derived [should
be] the initial owner of those materials, and that legitimate transfers from them to scientists
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Rao examines the overlapping legal regimes of property, contract, and privacy
to tease out the incoherence that law applies to individuals’ rights and
relationships to excised cells and tissues. She suggests a model of property in
the human body as stewardship, where individuals collectively possess
themselves in a public trust, rather than being outright owners.66
Not all commentators find the default rules established by Moore and
subsequent cases troubling. For example, Hakimian and Korn argue that the
Moore regime of diminished individual property interest in excised cells is
justifiable:
Because the benefits of medical knowledge derived from tissue research
potentially accrue to all individuals and future generations, society may justify
the expansive use of these valuable resources based on the principle of justice.
Human tissue specimens are a unique and irreplaceable research resource, and
society’s strong interest in the advancement of medical knowledge deserves a
coherent and internally consistent legal, regulatory, and ethical framework to
govern specimen use. 67

Similarly, Russell Korobkin argues that Moore correctly established an
important default rule—one based on contract rather than property—of no
compensation for transactions pertaining to human tissues.68 Nevertheless,
much of the literature surrounding Moore has expressed dissatisfaction with
both the outcome and default rules established by the case, which has led to
proposals for alternative models. For example, Charlotte Harrison has
suggested a hybrid approach that falls between notions of altruism and private
property, such that there would be “a general rule of donation for research
tissue at the time it is acquired” which would “provide an objective, nonmarket mechanism for compensation after research use for unusual cases in
which samples prove to have significant commercial utility.”69 Donna Gitter

must take place before scientists can rightfully possess, use, or sell those materials, or
exclude others from doing so.” Id. at 241.
66. Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the
Human Body, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 379-80 (2007). See also Rao, supra note 8.
67. Rina Hakimian & David Korn, Ownership and Use of Tissue Specimens for
Research, 292 JAMA 2500, 2504 (2004).
68. Korobkin notes “[i]n the twenty-first century, biotechnology is becoming
increasingly important in medical research. If biomedicine is able to fulfill the hopes of the
scientific community by creating a new paradigm for the treatment of disease – one in which
biological agents regenerate diseased or dead tissues – disembodied tissues could become the
cures for a variety of ailments. It is likely that scientists around the world will need a
tremendous amount of human tissues of all types just to mount the research effort, regardless
of whether the promise is ever actually fulfilled. In the new era of biomedical technology, it
is critically important for the law to facilitate tissue transactions efficiently. This, in turn
requires understanding and embracing the underlying wisdom of Moore.” Russell Korobkin,
“No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”: Moore v. Regents and Default Rules for
Human Tissue Donations, 40 J. HEALTH L. 1, 27 (2007).
69. Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for
Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 78 (2002).
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takes a different approach in proposing that Congress recognize individuals’
enduring property interest in excised human tissues by enacting legislation that
not only allows research participants to sell human tissues for research
purposes but also expressly provides for a tort of conversion if researchers
wrongly use such materials.70
Despite these wide ranging perspectives, there has been no conversation in
the literature—legal, biomedical, or otherwise—on how the development of
iPSCs significantly complicates the existing conversation on property interests
in excised human cells and tissues.71 What is needed is a discussion of how
iPSCs might shift the empirical footing underneath these theoretical, policy,
and doctrinal conversations by making the existing logic behind the differential
treatment of somatic cells and gametes/embryos largely incoherent. Prior to the
development of iPSCs, the default rule regarding individuals’ property interests
in excised cells worked reasonably well by efficiently giving scientists access
to research materials without exposing donors to the risk that their cells could
be used by third parties to create new humans with a genetic tie to them. The
default rule acts as a firewall in acknowledging a residual property interest in
gametes and embryos outside of the body so that progenitors can control their
disposition. But iPSC research disrupts the protections afforded by this default
rule by giving somatic cells the potential to create human life without extending
a residual property interest to donors so that they may limit the use of somatic
cells for reproductive purposes. A model is needed that allows the law to coevolve with technology in a manner that is least disruptive to the existing
default rules. Yet it is also important to maintain the sensibilities of promoting
efficient research with somatic cells and tissues while also giving donors a
heightened property interest in excised cells with reproductive abilities. Here,
we propose a three-part approach.
B. A Three-part Proposal
1. Self-imposed moratorium on using iPSCs for human reproduction
To address the jurisprudential instability in property law created by iPSCs,
we first argue that the research community should implement a self-imposed
moratorium on applications of iPSC research that pursue human reproduction

70. Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal
Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 339-41 (2004).
71. Zarzeczny et al. come the closest to raising these issues (albeit in a non-legal
journal article) by discussing the possibility of “reach through rights” stemming from iPSC
research, whereby donors may have a controlling interest in the use of cell lines resulting
from their tissues. However, this does not speak to the issue identified in this Article, i.e. that
iPSCs complicate existing default rules pertaining to individuals’ property interest in excised
biological materials. See Zarzeczny et al., supra note 53, at 1034.
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with somatic cells from individuals who have not specifically given informed
consent for their biological materials to be used in this manner. We are not the
first to suggest that certain types of iPSC research should not proceed. Bernard
Lo et al. have argued for a moratorium in relation to the potential use of iPSCs
for reproductive cloning purposes, citing both safety and ethical concerns.72
However, the manner in which iPSC research potentially destabilizes the
existing default rules pertaining to property law suggests that this provides
another important reason to stop human reproductive applications with somatic
cells from individuals who have not specifically consented to this use until
further legal and policy deliberations can take place.
We do not suggest that iPSC research pertaining to animal models should
stop. Nor do we necessarily suggest that all iPSC research with human cells
should cease. We do, however, find the safety and ethical concerns pertaining
to human reproductive cloning raised by Lo and his colleagues to be quite
persuasive. Accordingly, we specifically tailor this first part of our proposal to
the indeterminate property interest raised by using somatic cells from nonconsenting individuals for iPSC research,73 to the extent that this technology
may give somatic cells the same potential to become human life as gametes and
embryos, where progenitors retain a property interest after excision. We believe
that the scientific community should take a leadership role in assessing and
resolving the tensions regarding the ownership of excised biological cells
created by iPSC research. This should start with a self-imposed moratorium on
the most questionable aspect of this technology—research that results in the
creation of reproductive cells that have the potential to create life and whose
donors did not specifically consent to this purpose. While some may argue that
a self-imposed moratorium would not be effective in stopping this research, we
believe that research institutions and funding organizations can provide the
appropriate combination of incentives and disincentives to require clear consent
from donors that unequivocally demonstrates their understanding that their
cells will be used for iPSC research and that they appreciate the full range of
potential outcomes. For the scientific community to not take the lead with this

72. “There continue to be compelling safety reasons to ban human reproductive
cloning. Existing laws and professional guidelines should be carefully revised to cover
tetraploid complementation with iPSCs and other technologies in addition to [somatic cell
nuclear transfer], thereby broadening the ban on attempts at reproductive cloning to existing
and future technologies.” Lo et al., supra note 59, at 20.
73. Aalto-Setälä et al. discuss the importance of consent in iPSC research, noting that
“iPS cells are an exciting new approach to developing pluripotent stem cell lines that are
genetically identical to people with known phenotypes. While they avoid the ethical issues
inherent in embryonic stem cells, they do raise some ethical concerns regarding consent for
future research. Obtaining consent for fundamental downstream research with iPS cells,
together with offering the options of allowing recontact by researchers and giving permission
for additional sensitive types of future research, will show respect for somatic cell donors,
promote public trust in stem cell research, and allow optimal use of scientific discoveries.”
Aalto-Setälä et al., supra note 52, at 207.
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rather nominal proposal risks creating the perception that they are more
interested in preserving the unadulterated commercial potential of iPSC
research rather than respecting the law’s concern with preserving individuals’
property interests in excised cells with the potential to create human life. This
perception, if fostered by the research community’s reluctance, may lead to
distrust among potential research participants. This may stifle development of
human applications of this technology as well as others. We believe that this
moratorium should only be in place for a limited period, at least until the
proposal’s second part is in place.
2. Legislative action
Second, we argue that Congress should consider legislation that
acknowledges a property interest in excised somatic cells that vests back to the
progenitor once these cells are reprogrammed to a state of pluripotency and
differentiated into reproductive cells. Since the characteristic that destabilizes
the existing default rules is induced pluripotency that can lead to the creation of
reproductive cells—the outermost point at which a somatic cell has the
potential to create an independent human organism—it makes clear legal and
scientific sense to protect individuals’ property interests at this point like any
other excised reproductive cell with this potential. To the extent that this has
been the key rationale for the differential property interests given to these cells,
Congress can quickly and logically bring uniformity to this area of property law
by extending existing property interests in gametes and embryos to somatic
cells at the moment they cease to function as ordinary body cells and obtain
reproductive capacity through the processes of induced pluripotency and
differentiation. Such Congressional action would provide the most protection to
potential research participants and encourages iPSC researchers to specifically
seek informed consent from the progenitors of somatic cells and tissues.
3. Judicial action
Lastly, in light of these scientific developments and proposed
Congressional actions, we argue that courts should distinguish Moore to clearly
identify a property interest in excised somatic cells that are reprogrammed and
differentiated into reproductive cells through the processes of induced
pluripotency. This will add further consistency to the existing jurisprudence by
demonstrating that the acknowledgement of a property interest in somatic cells
that have been reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive cells is not a
departure from the existing default rules. Rather, it is consistent with the court’s
longstanding emphasis on protecting individuals’ interests in excised biological
materials that have the potential to create autonomous human beings. To the
extent that iPSCs may not be the last technique to confer pluripotency to
somatic cells, such judicial pronouncements can create a stable paradigm that
protects individual property interests. It can also provide a predictable research
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environment for researchers seeking consistency in how to handle excised cells
and tissues and how to assess the commercial viability of their research.
C. Three Possible Objections
There are at least three different concerns to this proposal that merit
discussion. First, there is the argument that the proposed approach is overly
broad. Many in the research community may argue that iPSC research can go
forward without any type of self-imposed moratorium, Congressional action, or
judicial affirmation as scientists can be trusted to not abuse donors’ samples,
the public’s trust, or existing ethical guidelines. However, we argue that this
issue is too important to allow human applications of iPSC research to exist
within the status quo default rules as this may lead to the existing paradigm’s
perversion. Scientists are given a default property interest in excised somatic
cells because they are ostensibly of little use to most individuals. Yet, this rule
can now “lock out” individuals from any property interest in their own cells
once they are reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive cells with the
potential to become life. Our proposal is a logical extension of the current
default rules. We simply argue that law should extend the same property
interest to somatic cells that are conferred to gametes and embryos once these
somatic cells are reprogrammed and differentiated to exhibit traits that are
substantially similar to those of ordinary reproductive cells—and therefore
have the potential to become new human beings.
A second concern is that the vesting feature of our proposal—where
Congressional action would confer a property interest to somatic cell donors
once their cells have been reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive
cells—is too burdensome to be functional; it would require each and every
somatic sample to be tracked in light of the possibility that it might be used for
iPSC research. However, this concern overstates the issue. Our proposal is
designed to incentivize the creation of separate biobanks where somatic cell
and tissue donors have specifically consented to the use of their samples for
iPSC research. Thus, the point of Congressional action of this nature is for the
market and scientific community to develop a workable model outside of
requiring the tracking of all banked biological samples on the off chance that
they may be useful to iPSC researchers. The creation of separate biobanks with
donors fully consented about the prospects of their samples being used for iPSC
research can create new efficiencies in that researchers can have confidence
that they are using samples in an ethically appropriate manner and that donors
are fully aware of the potential use of their samples.
A third objection that may be raised by this proposal is that it introduces
unnecessary instability in this area of law and threatens the established property
interests conferred to researchers through the default rules established by
Moore, Davis, Hecht, and other cases. Put differently: leave well enough alone.
This possible objection both understates and overstates the significance of the
proposal being made. It understates it in that what might be considered “well
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enough” for the research community may not be the case for individual cell and
tissue donors. Yet, it also overstates things in that the proposal does not take
anything away from researchers, nor does it change the existing default rules.
Indeed, the default differential property interests are preserved. Our proposal
simply addresses the new middle ground created by somatic cells that are
reprogrammed to a pluripotent state, and conservatively errs on the side of
individual donors to the extent that reprogrammed pluripotency and subsequent
cell differentiation can give somatic cells the very potential to become life that
the existing default rules acknowledge as a key reason for extending property
interest to donors. Rather than destabilizing the existing regime, this proposal
respectfully adheres to the preferences and concerns embedded in the existing
default rules.
CONCLUSION
Discussions concerning property rights in the body have been ongoing for
hundreds of years. Moore v. Regents of the University of California was a
watershed moment in establishing the foundation for the current default rules
concerning the type of property interests individuals have in excised somatic
cells, with subsequent cases adding the bricks and mortar. This Article has
shown the evolving nature of these property interests, especially in the context
of new genetic technologies such as iPSCs. By giving somatic cells the
potential to become life, iPSCs challenge the entire modern regime concerning
property interests in excised human cells and tissues and create new
opportunities for rethinking this area of law. Our proposal provides a coherent
framework to deal with the implications iPSCs might have for property law
without upending this entire jurisprudence. By granting the same property
interest in gametes and embryos to somatic cells that are reprogrammed and
differentiated into reproductive cells, the current legal framework, policy
preferences, and expectations among scientists and research participants are
preserved. In addition, this recognition of property interests creates an incentive
for the iPSC research community to develop separate biobanks composed of
samples from donors who fully consent to their cells and tissues being
subjected to this new technology. This provides a viable means by which the
integrity of both the iPSC research agenda and cell and tissue donors can be
preserved.

